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1. Executive summary 
The UN mission in Liberia stands out from other UN peacekeeping 
missions in the way it has managed to integrate the sub-national level 
through organizational innovations. County Support Teams (CST) 
were set up in 2006 and the position of the Head of Field Office 
(HoFO) established in each county in 2008.1 The HoFo positions were 
in most cases filled by a senior Civil Affairs (CA) officer with experi-
ence in the respective county. These organizational innovations 
equipped the UN with formalized representatives and coordination in 
each county, which strengthened the decentralization of the mission. 
A horizontal level of information sharing was introduced and a central 
authority on county the level was institutionalized. Improvements in 
the coordination aspect were further reinforced by a joint approach 
with UNDP as partner, supported by the entire UNCT, and the central 
role of CA and later the county-level HoFOs. 
 
This report is part of a comparative study of UN local peacebuilding 
in three countries – Liberia, Haiti and South Sudan. When initiating 
this study, the research team chose the Civil Affairs section of UN 
peacekeeping operations as an entry point, since this section is usually 
deployed wherever the peacekeeping mission has established 
presences, and is tasked, inter alia, with acting as the intermediary 
with local authorities and populations, as well as with the rest of the 
UN peacekeeping mission and other UN actors. 
 
Civil Affairs is the UN component most consistently present in the 
field in UN peacekeeping operations. It is one of the largest civilian 
components in UN peacekeeping, with around 800 staff members de-
ployed globally to facilitate the implementation of peacekeeping man-
dates at the sub-national level.2 CA officers frequently act as space-
makers for other actors to fulfil their roles and peacebuilding activi-
ties. 
 
In Liberia, the focus of the CA section has evolved with the develop-
ment of the mission. It can be divided into three phases. First, prior to 
the 2005 elections, CA work centred on the restoration of state author-
ity. In this period, CA officers were often the only civilian permanent 
                                                 
1  Although most of the HoFO were and still are CA officers, they have been given a new 
rank and now report directly to the DSRSG, not to the CA sections, but. Nevertheless, 
many HoFOs still see themselves at least partially as ‘CA people’.  
2  Including professional national and international officers and UN Volunteers. Information 
as of January 2010. Interview with UN DPKO Best Practices Officer, New York, July 
2010. 
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UNMIL staff in the counties. Second, after the elections and the inau-
guration of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2006, CA support 
turned towards capacity building and logistical support to the newly-
elected officials, serving as a central source of information to other 
UN agencies and INGOs that were beginning to develop projects in 
the counties. The increasing number of actors required a strengthening 
of coordination, and in 2006 the CSTs were set up, followed by the 
HoFos in 2008. And third, in 2010 the mission initiated the drawdown 
phase. This meant that during our fieldwork in 2011 much of the mis-
sion’s attention, including CA, was on transition and the withdrawal 
plan. A main CA priority in this phase was to ensure that local gov-
ernments and non-state actors would be able to continue functioning 
without the support of UNMIL.  
 
As shown with these three phases, UNMIL, through Civil Affairs, has 
a strong presence and continuity at the sub-national level. Officers of-
ten are present for several years and can establish stable relationships 
with county authorities in the administrative and civilian sectors. Their 
focus is on the county, on the local circumstances, rather than specific 
projects and issues. 
 
At first sight, many of our findings at the sub-national level seem to 
contradict the findings of the critique of liberal peacebuilding. Local 
populations are consulted in development planning. The local level 
has been strengthened, and field offices provide an institutionalized 
infrastructure for contextualizing peacebuilding to local circumstanc-
es. The field offices work rather independently of the national level, 
and sensitivity to local needs is high among local staff. However, 
global dynamics and donor concerns often impact on local needs, 
challenging the contextualization to local circumstances. Our conclu-
sion thus is a double-edged one. On the one hand, there is a huge po-
tential for contextualizing peacebuilding to local circumstances within 
the existing structures in Liberia. With the organizational measures 
that have been taken and the many tendencies that point towards suc-
cess, there are many lessons to learn from Liberia on local-level 
peacebuilding in post-conflict countries. However, this potential of 
contextualization has not been fully utilized, and is often not ade-
quately valued at the national level. 
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Summary of recommendations 
On implementation of the mandate: 
 Local and traditional structures should be better mapped and 
better understood. On this basis, regular feedback on how to 
interact in situations of norm conflict could be provided. 
 Enhance the learning process within the various institutions, to 
ensure that knowledge is shared between regions and handed 
over in the case of staff turnover. 
 CSOs should be engaged pro-actively by UNMIL and state au-
thorities as partners in peace building. The role of CSOs in the 
County Steering Committees should be strengthened.  
 
For UNMIL and the national government: 
 To help ensure a successful transition, UNMIL should contin-
ue to support the strengthening of the communication infra-
structure between the capital, and the county and the district 
capitals, building on the ongoing work of the CSTs. CA should 
continue to encourage and support the set-up and continuity of 
these structures, but also focus on handing over this role.  
 
For the transition: 
 Before UNMIL withdraws, a national mechanism should be 
developed to replace the CA presences in the counties. This 
should be done by building on the ongoing work of the CSTs. 
 CA should play a supportive role in setting up regional civilian 
coordination hubs to serve as a continuous county extension of 
the UN’s ‘Delivering as One’ concept.  
 CA should encourage and support the government of Liberia 
in its work in establishing local Liberian monitoring teams that 
can ensure accountability for and implementation of various 
development projects. The Peace Committees in these coun-
ties, established with the support and the facilitation of CA, 
represent a first step in this direction.  
 The various agencies and UNMIL sections should build more 
on the county- specific expertise of HoFO and CA. 
 
For local-level peacebuilding: 
 Continue decentralization efforts of national strategies and 
strengthening the development of county funds and county-
specific agendas. 
 Increase the influence of local consultations on final outcomes 
in development strategies and similar documents. Strengthen 
the capacity of local state and non-state actors to produce ade-
quate documents. Provide greater flexibility for local adapta-
tion of national frameworks.  
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 Conduct sector-specific consultations and ensure that all 
groups are heard through consultations. Move beyond consul-
tations wherever possible, and engage local organizations in 
dialogue and negotiation of final documents. 
 UN peacekeeping missions should work to reinforce the capac-
ity of civil society as early as possible.  
 The HoFO structure should be seen as an overall success in 
combination with the earlier foundation of County Support 
Teams (CSTs). Equally strong coordination should be envisa-
ged for new missions.  
 
 
2. Introduction  
‘Some things in Liberia are quite different and it just doesn’t work based on in-
ternational best practices. That’s where we assist our international partners with 
providing context.’3 
  
‘In the first time in our history, people could make some suggestions. There was 
a determined effort to get citizens to participate. (…) But then most was lost on 
the way, in the effort to adapt to World Bank standards.’ 4 
 
The UN and other international organizations engaged with peace-
building5 have been heavily criticized by scholars for being stuck in 
the global and applying a deductive Western rationality in their work. 
The consequence, the critics argue, is a huge gap between the needs 
on the ground and the means provided by these organizations. Current 
scholarly research has focused on the challenges within international 
organizations and the failure to adapt their efforts to local needs, with 
resultant poor delivery.6 Few attempts have been made to investigate 
and empirically analyse the challenges on the ground and take into 
account the structures and approaches already existing within local 
societies.7 The practical links between local approaches and interna-
tional peacebuilding have been poorly covered, and the sub-national 
level of international peacebuilding remains widely ignored by schol-
arly research. The academic literature often criticizes the international 
community for being post-colonial, orientalistic and stuck in a West-
ern rationality when deployed to a post-conflict country such as Libe-
                                                 
3  National CA officer, Monrovia. 
4  Leading CSO representative, Monrovia. 
5  Peacebuilding was first defined in 1992 by former UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali as ‘ac-
tion to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid relapse into conflict’ Boutros-Ghali, B. 1992. An agenda for peace: preven-
tive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping: report of the Secretary-General pursu-
ant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 
1992, New York, United Nations: para. 21. This project has examined how the UN is un-
dertaking local-level early peacebuilding, focusing on the efforts of the UN DPKO Civil 
Affairs section. The rationale for making this connection between CA and local-level 
peacebuilding is grounded in the evolving understanding that ‘peacekeepers are peace-
builders’ and should implement early peacebuilding tasks. United Nations 2012, Peace: 
Keep it. Build it. The Contribution of United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuild-
ing: Strategy. UN DPKO and DFS, New York: p. 10.   
6  Autesserre, Séverine. The trouble with the Congo: Local violence and the failure of inter-
national peacebuilding. Cambridge studies in international relations 115. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010,  Paris, Roland. ‘International peacebuilding and the “mis-
sion civilisatrice”’, Review of International Studies 28 (2002): 637–56. Barnett, Michael. 
‘Building a Republican Peace. Stabilizing States after War’. International Security 30, 
no. 4 (2006): 87–112. 
7  Neumann, Hannah. ‘Taking a Micro-social Perspective of Impact of Peacebuilding Inter-
ventions on Rural Citizens: Case Study of a Liberian Community.’ Peace, Conflict & De-
velopment 18 (2011):  
 forthcoming 
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ria.8 Such critics rarely take into account the components of the inter-
national community specifically designed for adapting to local needs 
and political realities, especially at the sub-national level. Such critics 
further fail to acknowledge who the actors working for these organiza-
tions are and where they come from. A recent overview mapping the 
nationality of all the 870 UN’s Civil Affairs officers deployed to the 
field shows that most of these officers actually come from Africa.9 
 
Empirical research with a focus on Liberia has often been critical to 
the mission.10 UNMIL has been present in Liberia since 2003. What 
has been mandated as a non-executive mission has turned into a tacit 
trusteeship,11 with UN ‘making plans for Liberia’.12 This holds the 
danger that standardized approaches may be implemented at the ex-
pense of contextualized solutions. Morten Boas, for example, has 
called for a more pragmatic approach from external actors that should 
draw on a wider segment of the Liberian society.13 Boas’ focus was on 
the central government, government policy production and the elitist 
circle around the president. His research, like most research dealing 
with post-war reconstruction, focuses on the national level and is con-
cerned with activities in the capital. The failure of the scholarly litera-
ture to include the sub-national level represents a weakness that is re-
peated, and not only in studies focusing on Liberia. Scholars often 
seem aware of the activities of the many INGOs, UN agencies and 
UNMIL working at the more local levels.14  
                                                 
8  Atkinson, Philippa. ‘Liberal interventionism in Liberia: Towards a tentatively just ap-
proach?’ Conflict, Security & Development 8, no. 1 (2008): 15–45. 
, Sending, Ole. ‘Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context’. 
NUPI Working Paper Series 761. 
9  Including professional national and international officers and UN Volunteers. UN 2012. 
Civil Affairs Staffing January 2012. UN DPKO, New York. A total of 1009 officers have 
been mandated, but only 870 are actually deployed. 
10   Atkinson, Philippa. ‘Liberal interventionism in Liberia: Towards a tentatively just ap-
proach?’ Conflict, Security & Development 8, no. 1 (2008): 15–45. Andersen, Louise. 
‘Outsiders Inside the State: Post-Conflict Liberia between Trusteeship and Partnership.’ 
Journal of intervention and statebuilding 4, no. 2 (2010): 129–52. 
Boas, Morten. ‘Liberian Civil War: New War / Old War?’ Global Society 19, no. 1 
(2005): 73–88. 
———. ‘Making plans for Liberia – a trusteeship approach or good governance?’ Third 
World Quarterly 30, no. 7 (2009): 1329–41. 
Boas, Morten, and Karianne Stig. ‘Security Sector Reform in Liberia: An Uneven Part-
nership without Local Ownership.’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4, no. 3 
(2010): 285–303. 
,  Neumann, Hannah. ‘Taking a Micro-social Perspective of Impact of Peacebuilding In-
terventions on Rural Citizens: Case Study of a Liberian Community.’ Peace, Conflict & 
Development 18 (2011):  
 Schia, Niels Nagelhus and Benjamin de Carvalho. ‘Nobody Gets Justice Here!’: Address-
ing Sexual and Gender-based Violence and the Rule of Law in Liberia’. NUPI Working 
Paper 761. 
Schia, Niels Nagelhus and Benjamin de Carvalho. Peacebuilding in Liberia and the Case 
for a Perspective from Below. NUPI Working Paper 778. 
11  Andersen, Louise. ‘Outsiders Inside the State: Post-Conflict Liberia between Trusteeship 
and Partnership.’ Journal of intervention and statebuilding 4, no. 2 (2010): 129–52. 
12  Boas 2009. Making plans for Liberia – a trusteeship approach or good governance?’ Third 
World Quarterly 30, no. 7 (2009): 1329–41. 
13  Ibid., 1246. 
14  Severine Autesserre, for instance, spent one year in east Congo doing fieldwork for her 
The Trouble with the Congo. She argues that the international community lacks the means 
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Roland Paris has identified ‘the emergence of what might be called a 
“hyper-critical” school of scholars and commentators who view liberal 
peacebuilding as fundamentally destructive or illegitimate’.15 Accord-
ing to Paris, such scholars portray peace operations of the last two 
decades as doing ‘more harm than good’ and as a form of Western of 
liberal imperialism that seeks ‘to subjugate the societies hosting the 
mission’.16 Paris aims to save liberal peace mainly because he thinks it 
is a good project worth saving. In this report, we have a less normative 
intention, and simply argue that the criticism of liberal peace has not 
taken into account the more inductive parts of the UN apparatus that 
have actually been designed in order to adapt peacebuilding efforts to 
the needs on the ground.17 We argue that UN peacebuilding is aware 
of the need to tailor peacebuilding to local circumstances, but cumber-
some processes and predefined frameworks have hampered the full 
exploitation of this potential.  
 
The data of this report were generated during a four-week field trip to 
Liberia, with fieldwork at UNMIL HQ and four field sites. The aim of 
the project has been to take a closer look at how the UN is undertaking 
local-level peacebuilding. The entry point for this exercise has been 
the UN’s Civil Affairs section of the DPKO (Department for Peace-
keeping Operations). Civil Affairs (CA) is the civilian component of 
peacekeeping missions that is most frequently deployed throughout 
the host country and present at the sub-national levels. Our project has 
used Civil Affairs as entry point, to see how different missions im-
plement their mandate and contextualize international guidelines to 
national and local circumstances. We have also examined how UN 
peacekeeping is organizing its work on the local level and working 
together with local authorities, other UN agencies and development 
actors. Within this overall project, fieldwork has been conducted in 
Haiti (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti – MINUSTAH), 
Liberia (United Nations Mission in Liberia – UNMIL) and South Su-
dan – (United Nations Mission in South Sudan – UNMISS). While the 
present report focuses on the role of civil affairs, it will frame these 
within the broader UN engagement in local-level peacebuilding in Li-
beria. It will, however, not be able to map every single actor involved 
in local-level peacebuilding, nor will it delve into precisely which en-
tity is contributing to which outcome. It aims to offer an aggregated 
account of local-level peacebuilding with a focus on UNMIL and its 
                                                 
for dealing with local conflict, and consequently fails to build peace in the country. How-
ever, despite her lengthy fieldwork, she makes no mention of any of the UN components 
present at the sub-national level and heavily engaged with local actors. 
15  Paris (2010: 338). Saving liberal peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies 36, no.2 
(2010): 337–65. 
Reno, William. Warlord Politics 
16  Ibid. 
17  See for instance, Schia, Historical overview of the UN Civil Affairs, forthcoming NUPI-
report. 
16 Hannah Neumann and Niels Nagelhus Schia 
interaction with the local population, government and society; but the 
authors are very much aware that many other national and internation-
al actors are involved.   
 
3. Structure of the report and guiding 
questions  
We begin with a brief overview of Liberia and the challenges to local-
level peacebuilding, before proceeding to sketch the involvement of 
UN and CA. The following questions form the core of the research:  
 
 What kinds of mechanisms have been used to feed the voices of 
local state and non-state actors at the sub-national level into polit-
ical processes? 
 Are local state and non-state actors at the sub-national level able 
to influence national decision-making processes, and if so, how? 
 How are the needs for service provision and political participation 
dealt with at the sub-national level, and how do these needs feed 
into decision-making processes? 
 Do CA officers promote ownership and effective participation of 
all stakeholders in national and especially sub-national decision-
making processes, and if so, how?  
 How can CA officers contribute to strengthen the confidence of 
the local population in local authorities, and in the support given 
by the UN and other international actors? 
 How does the cross-mission representation role of Civil Affairs 
facilitate implementation and/or transition? 
 
The overall objective is see how the activities of these actors are con-
textualized to local circumstances. There is increasing recognition that 
the peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus is an artificial divide, and that, 
in reality, civilian peacekeepers can be considered early peacebuild-
ers.18 The question then is how/if they can perform a catalytic and en-
abling role to facilitate the developmental activities of other actors, 
UN and others, so as to create peace dividends from their presence.  
   
                                                 
18  The Accord issue 3/2011 was dedicated exclusively to the peacebuilding-peacekeeping 
nexus Accord, ‘Conflict Trends 3/2011: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Nexus,’ (Ac-
cord, 2011).  
4. Methodology 
Our research in Liberia builds on four weeks of fieldwork in Septem-
ber 2011. Approximately 80 extended qualitative and 20 short inter-
views were conducted in four counties. The research team was com-
posed of Hannah Neumann, Niels Nagelhus Schia, Felesu Swaray and 
Saah N’Tow.  
 
The first week was spent in Monrovia interviewing UNHQ senior 
staff, Liberian intellectuals and academic staff from the University of 
Liberia. Two one-week visits were made to the counties of  Lofa and 
Sinoe. Interviews were limited to the county capitals, Voinjama and 
Greenville. A further short visit to Tubmanbourg (Bomi County) and 
the field office of Montserrado County (located in Monrovia) com-
plemented these intensive case studies (see figure 1). The last few 
days were spent in Monrovia where the team met with UN stakehold-
ers and arranged focus groups with Liberian non-state actors to dis-
cuss the preliminary findings. 
 
The methods and tools used throughout the research were anthropolo-
gy-based and qualitative. In addition to participant observation and 
semi-structured interviews, the research team held several informal 
discussions with UN CA officers, other substantive sections within the 
mission, UNDP staff, state-level government, and civil society organi-
zations. Five focus-group discussions (FDGs) were carried out in local 
markets, on university campus and among rural villagers.  
 
Table 1: Interview partners19 on county and national level, by organizational 
background  
 
                                                 
19  This table shows only those interviews formally conducted as interviews. It does not in-
clude our many background talks and informative exchanges with people from all organi-
zational backgrounds. These serve to inform the following text as much as the formal in-
terviews, and should be seen as part of the participatory observation and fieldwork pro-
cess.   
20  We have interviewed average citizens and local leaders, such as town chiefs, in various 
field locations, as well as in Monrovia. But those are not actors at the national level. Thus 
we all aggregated them on county level, seeing those interviewed in Monrovia as citizens 
of Montserrado or their respective home counties. 
 CA staff Other  
UN staff 
Government  
authorities 
INGO, NGO 
and CSO staff 
Local citizens 
National level 15 8 4 10 020 
County level 10 15 13 11 24 (in FGD) / 
20 (individual) 
20 Hannah Neumann and Niels Nagelhus Schia 
Discussions were aimed at outlining key experiences and challenges 
in UN local-level peacebuilding, including strategies for contextualiz-
ing the mandate. Interviews with non-CA participants were intended 
to develop alternate perspectives on the work of CA, to better under-
stand cross-mission coordination and cooperation, as well as coopera-
tion with non-UN actors, including local stakeholders. Discussions 
with the wide array of local actors also sought to assess expectations 
and understandings of UNMIL in general, and CA in particular. Addi-
tionally, individual case studies were explored to unpack the processes 
and approaches of CA and other international actors at the sub-
national level.  
 
 
Figure 1: field sites 
Field trip 2: Sinoe County 
HQ visit: Monrovia 
Field trip 1: Lofa County 
Short trip 1: Bomi County 
Short trip 2: Montserrado County 
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Challenges in methodology 
The study offers some useful insights and reflections on the UN’s lo-
cal-level peacebuilding work in Liberia, from the perspective of CA 
officers as well as from local actors. However, this is not intended to 
be a comprehensive account of UN efforts in local-level peacebuild-
ing, nor of CA work in Liberia, particularly given the highly localized 
nature of local conflict dynamics and responses. More time would 
have been needed for a more comprehensive and deeper analysis.  
 
While we enjoyed the excellent support and hospitality of CA in Libe-
ria, we also made deliberate accounts to include Liberian voices in our 
research. In each of the field visits, we took a dual approach. The in-
ternational researcher interviewed local state authorities and key part-
ners of CA among the civil society. The national researcher travelled 
independently in the county and spoke with local religious leaders, 
elders and representatives from local civil society groups. It was not 
possible to find many women in relevant local government positions 
and there is an overwhelmingly male voice throughout the research. 
Whenever possible, the team made efforts to seek out women, so that 
female voices could be included.  
 
5. Country context  
Liberia was established in 1822 by the American Colonization Society 
as a colony for freed American slaves. It was founded as a country in 
1847. The freed American slaves, later called the Americo-Liberians, 
acted as the ruling class for more than a century.21 This created a divi-
sive society of ‘civilized’ rulers and ‘native’ dependants,22 consisting 
of 16 tribal/ethnic groups. In 1980 Samuel Doe overthrew the Tolbert 
government and became Liberia’s first native (i.e. non-Americo-
Liberian) president. However, Doe’s regime proved no less repressive 
and exploitative than those of his predecessors.23 Tensions erupted 
when Charles Taylor’s party National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) challenged Doe’s regime. Doe was overthrown and killed in 
1990, and by 1993 Taylor had taken control over most of the country. 
A first UN Observer Mission to Liberia (UNOMIL) coupled with 
military personnel from ECOWAS (ECOMOG) secured a 1993 peace 
agreement. The subsequent democratic elections in 1997 were won by 
Charles Taylor. A United Nations Peace-building Support Office 
(UNOL) tasked with assisting the government in consolidating peace 
superseded UNOMIL.  
 
Today, Liberia is still struggling with the material and social devasta-
tion after two civil wars with 14 years of conflict and instability in Li-
beria between 1989 and 2003.24 When the peace agreement was set-
tled, 270 000 people had been killed, one third of the population had 
been displaced and the country's institutions, infrastructure and econ-
omy were in ruins.  
 
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), currently in a draw-
down phase, was deployed in 2003 as a multidimensional peacekeep-
ing mission with 15,000 peacekeepers and civilian personnel.25 Today, 
nine years after the peace settlement, political authority has largely 
                                                 
21  One-party rule continued from 1870 to 1980. ‘Natives’ (see footnote below) were not 
allowed to vote until 1964. 
22  The terms ‘civilized’ and ‘native’ were introduced by the Americo-Liberians to differenti-
ate between settler and indigenous population. They still occur in government documents 
of today, such as the Rules and Regulations of the Hinterland.  
23  Boas 2009, Outram 1999. 
24  This period began with the revolt against the government and the execution of Samuel 
Doe in 1989 and ended with the peace accord and subsequent deployment of UNMIL in 
2003The Liberian parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra requesting 
the UN to deploy a force to support the National Transitional Government of Liberia 
(NTGL) and assist in the implementation of the Agreement. With the subsequent deploy-
ment of the ECOWAS Mission (ECONMIL), the security situation improved. UNMIL 
took over peacekeeping duties from ECONMIL and 3,500 West African troops were pro-
visionally ‘re-hatted’ as UN peacekeepers. 
25  UNMIL’s mandate was based on Security Council Resolution 1509 of September 2003. 
24 Hannah Neumann and Niels Nagelhus Schia 
been restored at the local level, a minimum amount of basic services 
has been established and people have returned to their communities 
and started to re-organize their lives. Furthermore, two peaceful elec-
tions in 2005 and 2011, a police and military reform, as well as a gen-
erally calm situation, appear to have reduced the necessity for a 
peacekeeping mission. Liberia was placed on the Peacebuilding 
Commission agenda in 2010 and a Statement of Mutual Commitments 
was issued on October 29 of the same year.26 Initial funding of US$ 
20 million was granted to the Liberian Peacebuilding Fund and pro-
jects were implemented throughout 2011. The focus of the Peace-
building Commission in Liberia is to ensure a smooth transition for 
UNMIL.27 Projects have been implemented in three core areas: 
strengthening rule of law, supporting security sector reform and pro-
moting national reconciliation.28 In early 2012, a Technical Assess-
ment Mission was evaluating the current role of UNMIL which will 
probably lead to a final plan for withdrawal. Despite this progress, the 
country still continues to face several serious challenges, such as: 
 
Political centralization: The government is overly centralized on the 
national level and in Monrovia.29 Central county-level positions are 
appointed by the president.30 The county authorities have very limited 
funds.31 Poor infrastructure impedes communications between the 
capital and the outlying counties.  
 
Popular mistrust towards government authority: National admin-
istration in Liberia has a long history of corruption, exclusion, abuse 
and violence.32 The government has been ‘more extractive in nature 
than catalytic’.33 Local and national authorities continue to be per-
ceived as unpleasant, untrustworthy and corrupt by many people in the 
rural regions.34 Local resources have often been exploited without 
proper accounting, circumventing the local communities concerned.35 
The recent account is ambivalent, but turnout for the October 2011 
was 71.8%, which indicates a belief in the political process despite 
negative perceptions of the authorities.  
                                                 
26  United Nations, ‘Statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia: Peace-
building Commission, Forth Session, Liberia Configuration,’ (General Assembly; Securi-
ty Council, 2010); PBC/4/LBR/2. 
27  United Nations, ‘Draft of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fifth session: Peacebuild-
ing Commission, Fifth Session, Organization Committee,’ (General Assembly; Security 
Council, 2011); PBC/5/OC/L.1. 
28  United Nations, ‘Statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia’. 
29  International Crisis Group, ‘Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils,’ (2004); ICG Africa 
Report No. 75. 
30  1986 Constitution of Liberia; Art 56 Sec. A. 
31  Ibrahim Nyei, ‘Liberia Decentralization Policy: a roadmap to participatory governance 
and development in Liberia’. 
32  Philippa Atkinson and Edward Mulbah 2000, J. G. Liebenow, 1987,, Mary H. Moran 
2008. 
33  Sawyer 2005. 
34  Paul Richards et al., 2005: 32. 
35  Reno 1999.. 
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Tribalism and ethnic conflict: Ethnic, religious and tribal tensions 
were strongly mobilized during the civil wars.36 They have continued 
to influence interaction between various groups on the local level and 
influence voting behaviour in the counties.37 Ethnically-based margin-
alization and exclusion still take place.38  
 
Lack of justice and sense of impunity: Like many other African 
countries, Liberia has a dual justice system.39 While the international 
community firmly supports the formal system, it remained largely ig-
norant of the customary system of justice, through which some 90% of 
all cases are dealt.40 Although the customary system lacks the formal 
authority to enforce verdicts, the statutory system is widely mistrusted 
and ineffective in the counties.41 This has led to a general crisis of 
confidence in the Liberian justice system.42 
 
Lack of basic infrastructure: Rural infrastructure has always been 
poor in Liberia. Despite manifold investments, basic infrastructure is 
stil largely lacking.43 The Poverty Reduction Strategy seeks to deal 
with this situation, but implementation remains slow.44 
 
The above-mentioned problems are not equally pronounced in all the 
counties of Liberia. Nevertheless, they provide a broader description 
of the general challenges and serve as background information for the 
following analysis. 
 
                                                 
36  Boas 2005, Ellis, 2007, D. E. Dunn, 1999. 
37  Sawyer, 2008, Neumann, ‘Taking a Micro-social Perspective of Impact of Peacebuilding 
Interventions on Rural Citizens’. 
38  Civil Affairs Section UNMIL, ‘Dealing with conflict creatively: Consultative Fora on 
Reconciliation, Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution’, (2009); Richards et al., 2008. 
39  A formal statutory system largely reflecting the US legal system is complemented by a 
state-authorized customary system. The statutory system is prevalent in urban areas and 
has final oversight on the customary system, which is regulated through the Rules and 
Regulations of the Hinterland. 
40  Patrick Vinck, Phuong Pham and Tino Kreutzer, ‘Talking Peace: A population based 
survey on attitudes about security, dispute resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in 
Liberia’. 
41  See: Schia and de Carvalho 2009, Deborah H. Isser, Stephen C. Lubkemann and Saah 
N’Tow, 2006. 
42  Felicia Coleman 2008, Schia and de Carvalho 2009. 
43  Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer, ‘Talking Peace’. 
44  For the current PRS see: http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Final%20PRS.pdf (last 
accessed 22 December 2011). 
6. Contextualizing peacebuilding  
activities to local circumstances – 
findings from Liberia 
There are several components, programs and actors focusing on local-
level peacebuilding in Liberia. CA places a key role, as the only civil-
ian component continuously present in all counties since the early 
phase of the mission.  
6.1  Brief introduction to Civil Affairs in Liberia 
Civil Affairs is the component most consistently present in UN peace-
keeping. With around 800 staff members deployed globally to facili-
tate the implementation of peacekeeping mandates at the sub-national 
level, it is one of the largest civilian components in UN peacekeep-
ing,.45 CA officers act as intermediaries between the local population 
and local government and the mission itself, frequently acting as 
space-makers enabling other actors to fulfil their roles, including 
peacebuilding activities.46 The Policy Directive on Civil Affairs out-
lines three main roles for CA in the field, depending on the mandate 
and the stage of mandate implementation:47  
 
 cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the 
local level 
 confidence-building, conflict management and support to rec-
onciliation  
 support to the restoration and extension of state authority. 
 
The focus of the CA section in Liberia has evolved with the develop-
ment of the mission and can be divided into the following three phas-
es: 
 
                                                 
45  Including professional national and international officers and UN Volunteers. Information 
as of January 2010. Interview with UN DPKO Best Practices Officer, New York, July 
2010. 
46  For policy documents on the role of UN DPKO on the local level, see e.g. United Nations 
DPKO, ‘Policy Directive on Civil Affairs,’ (2008), http://www.undg.org/docs/8915/Civil-
Affairs-Policy.pdf. and United Nations, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: ‘The 
Capstone Doctrine’,’ (UNDPI, 2008),  
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.p
df. 
47  United Nations DPKO, ‘Policy Directive on Civil Affairs’. 
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Phase 1: 
Initially, the focus of CA work was on the restoration of state authori-
ty, prior to the 2005 elections. Until 2005, CA officers were often the 
only permanent staff assigned to the counties. In addition to their pri-
mary roles as CA officers, they represented other UNMIL sections 
and UN agencies in the counties. 
 
Phase 2: 
After the election and the inauguration of President Ellen Johnson Sir-
leaf in 2006, the CA focus shifted capacity building and logistical 
support to newly elected officials. CA served as a central source of 
information to other UN agencies and INGOs that started to develop 
projects in the counties. The increasing number of actors necessitated 
greater coordination. County Support Teams (CST) were set up in 
2006, and in late 2008, the position of Head of Field Office (HoFO) 
was created in each county.48 These positions were generally filled by 
a senior CA officer with experience in the county in question. Both 
these organizational innovations equipped the UN with formalized 
representatives and coordination in each county, and the HoFO posi-
tions strengthened the decentralization of the mission.  
 
Phase 3: 
The mission started its drawdown phase in 2010, increasing its efforts 
after the successful elections of November 2011. During our fieldwork 
in 2011, much of the mission’s attention, including CA, was on transi-
tion and the withdrawal plan. A main CA priority in this phase was to 
ensure that local governments and non-state actors could continue to 
function without the support of UNMIL.  
 
Throughout these three phases, CA has had a strong presence and con-
tinuity at the sub-national level. Its personnel are often present for 
several years and have established stable relationships with county 
authorities in the administrative and civilian sectors. Their focus is on 
the county, on the local circumstances, rather than on specific projects 
and issues.  
6.2 Feeding local voices into the process: working with 
state and non-state actors 
UNMIL was mandated as a peacekeeping mission to assist the gov-
ernment of Liberia.49 By its very nature, it is expected to operate side 
by side with and in support of the national and local governments. 
                                                 
48  See also footnote 1 above.  
49  See e.g. the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia in 2003, 
which served as foundation for the Mandate 1509 and the subsequent establishment of 
UNMIL: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2003/875 (last ac-
cessed 20 January 2012).  
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This strong focus on government support has proven difficult: ‘If gov-
ernment doesn’t work, there is nothing we can do.’50 Civil society and 
other non-state actors played an important role in the initial years of 
the mission when state representatives were not yet present in the 
counties. It was not until after the 2005 elections that the local repre-
sentatives of the national government grew stronger and became in-
volved as actors. UNMIL continued to work with civil society actors, 
but not as extensively as before. CA officers have often facilitated and 
supported key tasks of civil society organizations, such as mediating 
in conflict, monitoring project implementation and holding local gov-
ernment accountable. Furthermore, CA has provided logistical support 
to government and civil society, as well as organizing local consulta-
tions which have served as a basis for later county assessments and 
development programmes. Through these efforts, UNMIL has been 
able to get very close to local events and discussions, on which they 
report regularly through CA and the HoFo. Within UNMIL, CA serve 
as ‘the eyes and ears of the mission’51 at the sub-national level. Much 
of their work focuses building and maintaining relationships, acquir-
ing and distributing information and providing space for the local 
population to articulate and exchange their ideas and concerns 
amongst themselves.  
6.2.1 Civil Affairs and County State Authorities 
CA support to the county authorities in Liberia has been extensive. 
They have helped facilitate local meeting and reporting structures, 
trained local personnel and provided logistic support – from printing 
minutes, to helicopter transport of staff. ‘They have given us an idea 
of how to run a government’, we were told.52 During our fieldwork in 
2011 we learned that many county ministries still lacked basic office 
resources. These offices often continue to rely on CA to forward in-
formation to and from their national counterparts, or for travel to more 
remote parts of the county.53 Despite the general drawdown of the 
mission, CA remains central in ensuring the functioning of local gov-
ernment authorities, especially in the remote counties.  
 
We still have to do many things that the government should be doing. And if we 
leave today, nobody would do it. So we are trying to make sure the government 
will do it.
54
 
 
                                                 
50  HoFO, Greenville. 
51  This expression was repeated used by CA officer in Monrovia and the counties in refer-
ring to their role within the mission. 
52  County Inspector, Greenville. 
53  In the counties, we often saw county representatives of the ministries printing minutes in 
the CA office or using UN computer facilities to write and receive emails from Monrovia. 
54  National CA officer, Voinjama. 
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These activities also provide a vehicle for informal exchange of in-
formation and advisory functions. 
 
Often the whole thing is like gambling. You put money on the table and get peo-
ple to do things. Civil Affairs doesn’t have money. Civil Affairs has knowledge. 
Civil Affairs has contact and it is present. That’s what we are offering to the au-
thorities and to other UN partners.
55
 
 
The withdrawal of CA from remote counties, such as Lofa and Sinoe, 
would be a challenge to local government authority if it were to hap-
pen today. True, the performance of local governments has improved 
since 2005, attendance rates have reportedly improved and reporting 
structures have been established. But despite all the work done to 
build up capacity, including hardware (buildings, vehicles, computers, 
printers, internet etc.) the drawdown of UNMIL and the CA will in-
evitably mean a massive lack of equipment in the counties. This might 
paralyse local state apparatuses and their involvement with the region 
and with the national level.56  
6.2.2 Support to national non-state actors 
CA’s support to non-state actors, such as civil society organizations 
(CSOs), traditional authorities and national NGOs, was and still is 
central to their role at the sub-national level. For CA, this supportive 
function provides avenues of exchange with non-state actors. Howev-
er, while CA has a pro-active approach towards the government, many 
interviewees stated that CA supports only those non-state actors that 
actively seek their advice and services. Several interviewees with ex-
perience with CA expressed appreciation, but also dependency on CA 
support: ‘they even went to the bank with us because we had no ac-
count’.57 Communication infrastructure beyond cell phones is non-
existent in many county capitals, so the only access to internet and 
computer infrastructure is at the CA office. Further, CA staff are often 
asked by local CSO groups to provide or coordinate transport to re-
mote areas to conduct investigations in cases of human rights abuses 
and gender-based violence or to facilitate workshops. 
  
Sometimes it comes up in meetings. They need support. The whole town uses 
our facilities. This will be a big challenge if the mission closes. Most don’t have 
resources because they are locally based. Sometimes they have small UNDP 
funding, but rarely. They catch us in town and ride with us to the office. And 
then they ask for using PC or doing small printing.58 
                                                 
55  International CA officer, Monrovia. 
56  Member of local government, Greenville; UNMIL and other agencies have invested huge 
efforts in rebuilding infrastructure, building capacity and equipping offices. As of 2011, 
however, many entities of the local administration were still dependent on UNMIL. 
57  Interview with a local NGO focusing on youth empowerment, Voinjama. 
58  HoFO, Greenville. 
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Representatives from umbrella organizations for CSOs increasingly 
voice their concern as regards the transition of UNMIL. They fear that 
only CSOs with continuous international support will be able to sur-
vive without CA support. This would drastically decrease the plurality 
of CSOs and make it nearly impossible to establish new organiza-
tions.59 
6.2.3 Creating space and linking state and non-state actors 
CA continues to be an important space-maker between the local popu-
lation, non-state actors and government authority on the sub-national 
level. This role emerged due to the continued presence of CA officers 
in the rural areas and their support to the restoration of state authority 
in the immediate post-war period. But it is also linked with the work 
they did for the county consultations of the County Development 
Agendas (CDAs) through the CST, which was the first time that Libe-
rians were consulted across the country in preparing development 
planning.  
 
Furthermore, through their role as facilitators, CA officers have 
helped organize local meetings and brought together people who had 
previously refused to talk to one another.60 These meetings have been 
complemented by national monthly County Coordination/County De-
velopment Steering Committee Meetings (CDSC) and pillar meet-
ings61 and are a key component of the national development plan and 
its county-level extensions. They serve as a venue for state and non-
state actors as well as representatives of the various donors to share 
information on developments and projects in the various counties and 
coordinate their efforts.  
 
Some NGOs paid for their arrogance when they were circumventing the County 
institutions. Many projects are abandoned today.62 
 
Initially, CA scheduled, chaired and documented these meetings. At 
the time of our fieldwork they were working to lessen their impact, 
but kept reminding officials about the importance of such events, and 
helped ensure that they were held regularly. 
 
With their strong presence and achieved credibility on the county lev-
el, CA officers have become key facilitators in conflict mediation. 
                                                 
59  This conclusion has been the result of our own research and was strongly confirmed in 
Focus Group Discussions held with CS umbrella organizations at national level.  
60  For these people CA also served as the gateway to the UN systems and INGOs. Thus 
local actors were interested in cooperation with CA and attended at the meetings. 
61  The names of this meeting change from county to county, but they follow the same mode 
and structure. While the County Coordination Meetings provide a general overview, the 
pillar meetings deal with specific areas, such as rule of law, gender or economic revitali-
zation, and vary from county to county.  
62  National CA officer, Monrovia. 
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They are credited for ‘providing space of exchange’ between the vari-
ous competing local actors, civil society organizations and the gov-
ernment, without influencing the outcome of such processes: 
 
Some time ago, there was some misunderstanding between us here (...). We saw 
them [CA] and received them and they played a major role in solving that prob-
lem. The major role they played was that they found out what brought that argu-
ment and they helped to solve that problem. They did it by how we settle things 
here. They said the way things are being done here, is how we will do it. Like the 
way you would solve the problem is how we will solve it too.63  
 
The main conflict mediation asset inherent in CA is the capability to 
generate a space for communication and mediation, where local actors 
can deliberate on local solutions to their problems and conflicts.  
6.2.4 The challenge of including non-institutionalized actors 
As the preceding accounts have shown, CA is a key section at the in-
terface between UNMIL and the Liberian people. Among many of our 
informants, CA was broadly perceived as being approachable and an 
accommodating component of the UN: ‘they are more like Liberians. 
They open up and associate with people.’64 Many people still perceive 
the UN, including the CA offices and meetings, as quite inaccessi-
ble.65 Massive fences, strict security checks and offices often located 
outside the town and on the premises of a military camp66 serve to 
discourage many from contacting CA. Security regulations and lim-
ited availability of vehicles also keep CA from travelling to the more 
remote and inaccessible parts of the country. 
 
Where CA interacts with the population, the support of its national 
staff is central in contextualizing international approaches. National 
CA officers serve as a ‘sourcebook’67 of local cultural and political 
knowledge, lowering the approachability threshold for local people, 
who often contact CA through its national staff as ‘the bridge to 
UN’68.  
 
We complement each other. Some things in Liberia are quite different and it just doesn’t 
work based on international best practices. That’s where we assist our international part-
ners with providing context. Like when we negotiate concession benefits with the com-
munities.69  
                                                 
63  Interview with a local town chief in Lofa county. 
64  Youth Representative, Voinjama. 
65  Interview with a scratch-card seller opposite the HQ in Monrovia.  
66  UNMIL tried to locate their civilian offices close to town and re-locate them from military 
camps to predominantly civilian offices. This was not possible in all counties. Further, the 
CA office of Montserrado had reportedly fewer civilian visitors since it moved to HQ 
premises and the security checks were stepped up. 
67  This specific term was used by an international CA officer in Greenville; similar observa-
tions were mentined by CA officers in all field offices. 
68  Student at University of Liberia, Monrovia. 
69  National CA officer, Monrovia. 
Contextualizing peacebuilding activities to local circumstances: Liberian case-study field report   33 
 
 
 
33 
Still, CA has experienced challenges on the local level with the many 
Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in Liberia. Because these 
organizations often lack formal structure, it is almost impossible for 
them to apply for funds or receive other means of support. ‘We have 
no petty cash to give to them’, a CA officer explained to us. 70 In con-
sequence, CA has started to encourage and support these CBOs to or-
ganize themselves in larger umbrella organizations, making them 
more attractive to donors and strengthening their voice in county 
meetings. 
 
CA helps us with how to promote ourselves. How to tell other organizations and 
donors about our network and what our positions are. In this way we hope to be 
able to increase our funding.71 
 
Another challenge comes from the traditional structures and secret so-
cieties, especially in northwest Liberia. These are widely perceived as 
religious organizations, but historical and ethnographic studies clearly 
show that they had, and still have, considerable political and economic 
influence in Liberia.
72 
The aspects of secrecy enshrined in their tradi-
tions, in addition to documented reports of human rights abuses,
73
 put 
CA and other UN agencies in a difficult situation. According to their 
mandate, CA is to respect local cultures, while at the same time advo-
cating human rights and transparency. CA is sensitive to this issue 
through its presence in the counties and its national staff members. 
Nevertheless, many interviews with the local population showed that 
interventions are perceived as interfering in their cultural practices: 
 
Sometime they are hurt. Traditional is how they used to handle things. Sometime 
civil affairs under UNMIL they want to change it in their own way that is West-
ern Culture. It does not correspond with our own culture sometime. Really, the 
aborigines of this land had their own cultures and tradition. Even some areas, if 
you look at some of the cultures it can be changed but there are some that cannot 
be changed. If you try to change certain cultures it hurts the local people.74  
 
UNMIL work to support formal education, formal courts etc. but 
would never support secret society schools such as the Sande or Poro 
schools. Furthermore, UNMIL works with NGOs, government, 
churches etc. but not with Zoes (leaders of African traditional reli-
gion). This is an aspect of ‘local voices’ that has been widely ignored 
or used only sporadically when needed for traditional reconciliation. 
                                                 
70  Local CA officer in Voinjama. 
71  Head of a local CBO umbrella organization, Voinjama. 
72  Little 1966,  Bellman1984, Richards et al., Community Cohesion in Liberia: A Post-War 
Rapid Social Assessment; Atkinson and Mulbah, ‘Peacebuilding and Complex Political 
Emergencies’. 
73  Since the end of the war, there have been documented cases of ritual killing and trial by 
ordeal. However, investigation has proven nearly impossible, as secrecy is upheld by most 
local communities. 
74  Member of a council of elders, Voinjama. 
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In general, the Liberian population sees CA as being much closer to 
the state actors than to the non-state actors.  
 
Often state authority and societal perceptions of what is right and what 
is wrong are in conflict. The role of local societies varies considerably 
from county to county.75 Many local CA officers and other UN staff 
expressed the need for more training on how to tackle such cases.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
General recommendation on the implementation of the mandate: 
 
 Local and traditional structures should be mapped and better understood. 
Based on such a mapping, regular feedback on how to interact in situations 
of norm conflict could be provided. The results of such a mapping should 
impact on UNMIL’s and CA’s cooperation with sub-national state authori-
ties 
 The learning process on how to deal with local processes and institutions 
should be enhanced within the different international institutions to ensure 
that knowledge is shared between regions and handed over in the case of 
staff turnover. 
 CSOs should be engaged pro-actively by UNMIL and state authorities as 
partners in peacebuilding. The role of CSOs in County Steering Commit-
tees should be strengthened.  
 
Specific recommendations for CA work and the transition period: 
 
 The continuity of CA work is a major asset. Staff turnover should be min-
imized in the counties. 
 Field offices should be situated so as to enable easy access by the local 
population. 
 Preparation for field officers should include a thorough introduction to the 
historical and cultural specificities of the location.  
 The access of local CBOs to computer and Internet facilities should be en-
sured after the field offices have closed. 
UNMIL and the UN agencies should work with the government of Liberia 
to develop mechanisms that will ensure the continuity of CDSC meetings 
after withdrawal. For instance, CSOs could take the lead, with UNDP play-
ing a supportive role (capacity-building and logistical support). All actors 
should support the government of Liberia to establish a control mechanism 
to ensure continued participation and accountability of local authorities af-
ter the transition.  
 
                                                 
75  Isser, Lubkemann and N’Tow, ‘Looking for Justice’. 
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6.3  Role of local actors at the sub-national level 
Liberia has always been a heavily centralized state. Poor infrastructure 
has contributed to this problem, and communication links between the 
capital and the more remote counties are still weak. County develop-
ment is decided upon in Monrovia. Services like the issuance of driv-
ers’ licenses and birth certificates are available only in the capital, and 
local revenues are administered on the national level.76 Some county 
capitals are physically disconnected from Monrovia during rainy sea-
son and can be reached only by helicopter. Communication between 
the national government and local county authorities is limited. Many 
of the county representatives we interviewed in September had still 
not received the Work Plan for that year. To the extent that they were 
aware of new policies regarding their duties, they had often received 
this information through CA.  
 
CA is a tremendous assistance. We receive information that come from head of-
fice in Monrovia, from the Ministry office. And they help us collect information 
and send to Monrovia.77 
 
The downwards sharing of information in the Liberian state apparatus 
is weak, and upward sharing is even weaker. The national government 
often approaches CA for information on the counties or even asks 
them to monitor the implementation of certain projects. One CA of-
ficer explained to us how this happens in the case of the county school 
boards: 
  
After the policy had been signed and the county schools boards had been estab-
lished. We [CA] sent out a query to the counties with questions like ‘Can you 
please tell us what works or what the problems with the county school boards 
are?’ So we could go and tell the minister what we can do about it. The same 
happens within the UN. At the One UN meetings we can share this information, 
and then the agencies can step in with funds. These boards will have to resume 
responsibility when we draw out.78 
 
In many cases CA is the only link of correspondence between the lo-
cal and the national levels. CA staff attend meetings to ensure the par-
ticipation of local authorities. They provide information from the na-
tional level to local authorities and to the national authorities regard-
ing the situation in the counties. The UN County Teams (UNCT) 
made efforts in 2011 to facilitate lines of communication between the 
local and national government as part of the decentralization process.  
However, according to UNMIL HQ staff and CA staff in the counties, 
the impact of regional information on the national level has remained 
                                                 
76  These problems are taken up in the current decentralization strategy, but ratification of 
this strategy has proven difficult. See Ibrahim Nyei, ‘Liberia Decentralization Policy: a 
roadmap to participatory governance and development in Liberia’. 
77  Minister of Education, Greenville. 
78  CA Officer, Monrovia. 
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limited. UNMIL has a supporting and partnering role in Liberia. The 
mission and the SRSG have no direct influence on the government. 
We were told that reports rarely impact on processes at the central 
level on the Liberian side or even within the UN. Both administrations 
seem to be overly bureaucratic and slow on this matter. Information 
and reports from the ground are not properly heeded, a CA officer told 
us. This officer further pointed out: 
 
Information often gets lost with the many steps it has to pass to the head. There 
are just too many reports. If they are shared widely, they don’t have any sensitive 
information. If they have sensitive information, no one gets to see them. Except 
maybe the really high-ups.
79
  
 
It can take years of continuous insistence by CA officers until a case 
or complaint reaches the higher levels before it can be solved on the 
ground.
80 
 
The international community in general, and UNMIL in particular, are 
equally centralized. This reflects the increasing urbanization of Libe-
ria, but ignores the historical legacy of a state in which centralization 
of political power in the capital has led to numerous conflicts. The 
main focus of the international community has been on Monrovia and 
the national government. After 2006,  however, this picture became 
somewhat more nuanced with the implementation of the CSTs and 
deployment of  county-based staff from Political Affairs, Human 
Rights section and some agencies. Projects were extended to the coun-
ties. Still, CA is the only civilian component present in all counties.81 
Many officers we spoke with complained about the scant contact they 
had with the national level: ‘I send report after report, and receive no 
feedback.’.82  
 
Due to the character of the CA officers’ role in the field, they work 
very independently. In general, they draft their own work plans, based 
on the county’s priorities, and they translate the rather broad mandate 
into daily realities.
83
 This allows for a substantial amount of contextu-
                                                 
79  International CA officer, Monrovia. 
80  One such case which we came across in our fieldwork involved the sentencing of four 
people for witchcraft in Grand Geddeh; they were released only two years later. Secondly, 
there the case of a regulation to be approved by the president to monitor exploitation 
rights for natural resources: it kept disappearing on the way to the president’s office. 
81  UNPol and the MilObs are present in the field offices, but they have a high staff turn-over 
and have very little continuous contact with local actors. Other sections, such as Political 
Affairs, Human Rights or Rule of Law have representatives in several counties (though 
not all), but they are very specialized in their responsibilities. CA, with the HoFO, is the 
only component that is present in all counties and has a generally holistic focus on county 
developments.  
82  CA officer, field office. 
83  The national Work Plan of CA prior to its review in 2010 was structured into five pillars: 
(1) Governance and Local Administration, (2) Natural Resource Management, (3) Infra-
structure and Basic Services, (4) Economic Revitalization and (5) Civil Society Organiza-
tions, Youth and Peacebuilding). 
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alization. CA officers with several years of experience in the counties 
have made deliberate use of this possibility.  
 
We have the five pillars: Security, Economy, Governance, Basic Services and 
Peacebuilding. That’s the base of the Work Plan. Within that framework we do 
our work. Whenever there is tricky situation, we consult the national focal 
points. (...) We have free space, much free space. If I say there is a need for this 
or that, I can do it. There is no micro-managing.
84 
 
CA serves as a resource for county-specific knowledge also on the na-
tional level, but the upward influence of CA from the counties remains 
weak. Whenever mention was made of a strong role of the local au-
thorities, this was in relation to the implementation of projects coming 
from the national level. The case of the Sinoe Rubber Plantation can 
illustrate the roles of different national and local actors and the coor-
dination role often taken by CA.  
 
Case Study 1: Sinoe Rubber Plantation 
The Sinoe Rubber Plantation has not been under the control of the Liberian gov-
ernment for years. Former combatants of the MODEL faction
85
 controlled large 
parts of it and illegally exploited rubber. Negotiations in 2005 brought no change 
to this situation. Ownership of the plantation remained unclear and local govern-
ment authorities were profiting from illegal rubber exploitation. Local communi-
ties often sided with the ex-combatants because they mistrusted any government 
efforts.  
 
The local CA officer repeated raised this issue in reports and personal communi-
cations with CA HQ who forwarded the issue to the joint UN – GoL Rubber Plan-
tation Task Force. This task force was established in 2006 by the SRSG and the 
Liberian President, and was mandated to re-establish state control over Liberia’s 
rubber plantations. It comprised a cross-section of ministries as well as key 
UNMIL sections and UN agencies. 
 
When rubber prices dropped in late 2009, illegal exploitation became less lucra-
tive and the local government, under pressure from the Task Force, made an at-
tempt to take control of the plantation. The local CA field office was heavily en-
gaged in this process and kept the Rubber Plantations Task Force informed. CA 
monitored the activities of the local actors, remained in constant contact and dis-
cussed possibilities to ensure their support. According to one member of the Task 
Force, they would call the HoFO in Greenville for advice and a general appraisal 
of the situation before taking any action.  
 
CA played a crucial role as the link between the local level (getting information), 
the national level (pressuring for action) and potential donors (increasing the 
peace dividend).  
                                                 
84  CA officer, Voinjama. 
85  During the Liberian civil war, the MODEL faction was a rebel group that launched at-
tacks from Ivory Coast against Charles Taylor. Its leader, Thomas Nimely, later became 
Liberia’s foreign minister in the Transitional Government. 
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When there are discussions between communities and companies or the 
government for concession benefits, CA facilitates such negotiations. 
Usually CA brings confidence and credibility to the process. Communi-
ties are very suspicious of the government. Judging from the time past, 
government often did not honour their commitments.
86
 
The leaders of the ex-combatants were arrested. At the same time, the RRR unit 
in Monrovia initiated a road rehabilitation project in the county to absorb former 
illegal exploiters and provide legal income opportunities. Further, Quick-Impact 
Projects were used as a way of negotiating with local communities to support 
interim management of the plantation. The situation was still fragile at the time of 
our fieldwork, but the plantation was finally brought under government control – 
with the initiative coming from the national level, but with the support of the local 
level. 
 
 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 
General recommendations for UNMIL and the national government: 
 
 In order to help ensure a successful transition, UNMIL should continue to 
support the strengthening of communications infrastructure between the 
capital, the county and the district capitals. This would help to raise 
awareness among national-level actors as to local needs. Such efforts 
should build on and enhance the ongoing work of the CSTs. CA could en-
courage and support the set-up and continuity of these structures.  
 
Specific recommendations for CA work and the transition period: 
 
 The field offices should build a reliable ground-structure that ensures the 
continuity of the ongoing CSTs and the exchange of information between 
the national and county levels.  
 CA should support and encourage national efforts towards political decen-
tralization (such as the national decentralization strategy) while remaining 
sensitive to challenges such as ethnic marginalization.  
 In order to help ensure a successful transition, the frequency of visits of 
CA focal points to the different villages in the counties should be in-
creased. This would contribute to enhanced capacity of the respective lo-
cal authorities in preparation for the exit. CA should play a supportive role 
in order to strengthen the decentralization process in the country. Focal is-
sues could include natural resource management and the national reconcil-
iation process. Strengthening the decentralization process should become 
a mandated task included in the work plans and performance assessment.  
 
                                                 
86  Local NGO representative involved in the negotiations with the local communities, 
Greenville. 
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6.4 The UN and local-level peacebuilding in Liberia 
The first programmes of UN agencies in Liberia (after the initial im-
mediate humanitarian aid) were individual agency projects at large. 
This changed with the launch of the Liberian Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy 1 (PRS1).87 The agencies developed the United Nations Devel-
opment Assistance Framework (UNDAF, in accordance with the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness) as a ‘joined-up’ UN response to 
national priorities.88 This was reflected on the local level by the foun-
dation of County Support Teams (CSTs) in 2006. Cooperation be-
tween UNMIL and the agencies further increased when the UN Secu-
rity Council approved Liberia as a ‘Delivering as One self-starter 
country’ (DaO) in 2010. The implementation of DaO has resulted in 
closer cooperation between the UN agencies and UNMIL, especially 
in the area of technical collaboration.89 DaO proved more successful 
in Liberia than in many other pilot countries. However, the DaO de-
sign has also triggered turf wars among the agencies. ‘Many just don’t 
get over this “this is my agency” thinking, and with Delivering as One 
they had to push it even stronger.’90 As many of the agencies depend 
on donations, they need to promote their work vis-à-vis potential 
fundraisers; working under a one-UN umbrella sometimes leads to 
fear among the agencies that their market value is being compromised. 
Many of our interviewees emphasized that coordination was needed in 
order to improve the agency programmes. The continuing competition 
between the agencies and the absence of a strong national-level coor-
dinating body often made such cooperation a tightrope walk.91  
6.4.1 Cooperation and Coordination 
Cooperation and coordination in the counties has been much closer 
from the beginning, mainly for pragmatic reasons. CA became the 
natural hub for information about the respective counties, due to their 
early deployment and long-time presence in the counties. They gained 
a role as central coordination body of UN activities at the sub-national 
level because they were able to provide local knowledge and monitor-
ing capacities.  
                                                 
87  The PRS1 is the main development strategy for Liberia. It has been developed with the 
World Bank and is the base for IMF support to Liberia. It is currently under revision. The 
document as well as further information can be found on the website of the Liberia Eco-
nomic Forum: https://sites.google.com/site/liberiaeconomicf/home (last accessed 20 
January 2012). 
88  This term was used by a member of the Residents Coordinator Office. The UNDAF doc-
ument itself can be found at: http://unliberia.org/doc/undaf_doc.pdf (last accessed 20 Jan-
uary 2012). 
89  The UN in Liberia now has one travel agency: it cooperates closer with regard to IT infra-
structure and maintenance and for transportation needs inside the country.  
90  Interview with UN staff, Monrovia. 
91  The Resident’s Coordinator office at UNMIL had only three permanent international staff 
as of 2011. Staffing was not improved after Liberia became a DaO pilot country. Support 
from DPKO or external consultants was scant, as reported by the staff members.  
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When the agencies came, there was no one else but us in the counties and they 
needed UNMIL for transport and for protection of their offices. They needed CA 
to know whom to work with. Local authorities often had no offices, so we were 
the ones who helped finding them and inform them. And when they had gone, 
we followed up on the implementation.92 
 
Despite such operational cooperation, information in the field offices 
tended to be sent upwards. Horizontal sharing across sections or be-
tween agencies needed to be improved. Staff in various agencies were 
working on similar issues, but under different chains of command.93 
This resulted in a ‘stove piping’ of efforts that slowed down decision-
making processes within the organization and led to a continuous 
shifting of individual responsibilities and accountability.94 At times, it 
could even represent a security threat.95  
6.4.2 A New UN Field Structure and County Support Teams 
A joint UN project ‘Strengthening Capacity of Local Administration’ 
(the CST project) was established in 2006 and led by a joint steering 
committee co-chaired by the UN Deputy Special Representative of the 
Secretary General / Resident Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC) and the 
Minister of Internal Affairs (MIA). The project focused on three main 
areas: restoring the functionality of county administrative offices and 
transportation; developing capacity of county officials; and strength-
ening data and information management in the counties.96 The CSTs 
worked through the local CA staff and later through the HoFO.97 The 
SRSG Loj approved a new UN field structure 2008. Field offices were 
strengthened in each county and headed by Heads of field Offices that 
were direct representatives of the SRSG in the counties, in order to 
ensure a coherent and consolidated UN approach to the specific chal-
lenges of the counties, and to support the local government and the 
Superintendent’s office. These attempts were in line with the decen-
tralization strategy of the Liberian government. 
 
This project worked through the local CA staff, but management was 
with the UNDP. Humanitarian and Political Section also dedicated 
staff, in addition to the CA, to the CST coordinator roles. CA further 
                                                 
92  National CA officer, Voinjama. 
93  This problem was described by international staff from various sections, especially by 
those who had been in the field offices during early stages of the mission and who now 
work at HQ in Monrovia. 
94  Winckler 2011. 
95  HoFO and former CA staff, Monrovia in an interview. Prior to the establishment of a 
HoFO position, the local CA officer had only limited knowledge on security situations as 
neither UNPol, nor Military Observers, nor local battalion officers would share their in-
formation. And yet, local CA officers were responsible for taking security decisions, as in 
the case of evacuation of the office. 
96  See UNCT’s joint programme document 2009. 
97  CA was mainly responsible for the County Support Teams. Management, however, was 
with UNDP. Humanitarian and Political Section also dedicated staff to support CST coor-
dinators. The HoFO replaced the CST coordinator in late 2008. 
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turned one UNV per county into project staff under a joint manage-
ment. This approach added considerable value to UN peacekeeping in 
Liberia because it provided a county comprehensive, but specific fo-
cus to the activities. This was confirmed by CA staff at the national 
level and staff within the Ministry of Planning and Infrastructure. The 
joint approach through CST meetings, the field offices in each county 
and the strong position of the HoFO in the field provided the UN with 
an organizational framework and a common vehicle for action at the 
local level. It helped organizations without local representations to 
extend their reach and deliverance to all counties. 
6.4.3 Head of Field Officers 
The CST coordinators established in 2006 were further developed, and 
in 200898  the local representation of the UN was enhanced with the 
SRSG’s appointment of Head of Field Officers (HoFOs) to each of the 
15 counties. 99 They are formally situated under the DSRSG/RC.100 
The HoFOs were and still are mostly CA officers, but work on behalf 
of the entire UN family. Their role is to serve as the overall facilitator 
of the CST process in their respective counties. The Field Offices are 
supported through the Field Support Team (FST) at headquarters lev-
el. 
 
The CST and later the HoFO structure introduced a horizontal level of 
information sharing and institutionalized a central authority on the 
county level. Today, all reports from the local section and UN agency 
representatives are to go through the HoFO. The improvement of the 
coordination aspect through the jointness of the approach (with UNDP 
as a partner, with the support of the entire UNCT and the central role 
of CA and later the HoFO in the counties), was confirmed by all agen-
cy representatives we met with in the counties. This new model also 
represented an improvement with regard to contextualization of the 
activities. For instance, CA was now receiving and sorting all incom-
ing requests to the mission, making sure that they ended up on the 
most relevant desk. This channelling of requests was valued from both 
sides: the agencies needed to review only ‘serious requests’. Local 
partners felt that requests channelled through either CA or the HoFO 
had a better chance of getting funding. As a UNDP representative in 
Voinjama told us: 
                                                 
 98  Field offices were headed by CST coordinators before 2008. Those were CA officers in 
most cases. 
 99  Although most of the HoFO were and still are CA officers, they needed to be given a 
new rank and were no longer reporting to the CA sections, but directly to the DSRSG. 
This was necessary because other sections of UNMIL and other UN agencies would not 
report to CA, but to the County Representative of the SRSG. Nevertheless, many  
HoFOs still see themselves at least partially as ‘CA people’.  
100  The UN resident coordinator is the coordinator of UN Agencies in programme countries. 
In Liberia he is at the same time DSRSG (Recovery and Governance), Humanitarian 
Coordinator and Resident Representative of UNDP. 
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The CA are interacting with the people, so the bulk of the requests goes through 
them. They look through the requests and make sure that they are complete be-
fore they are forwarded to us. The CA is not doing development projects, so 
when the community requests for instance a hand pump, they come to us and 
ask: ‘Do you have annual provision for that in your work plan?’ Then we send a 
request to Monrovia. And when we get feedback we tell CA who are the ones 
who will inform the community that we will build a hand pump. The Civil Af-
fairs brings us requests once or twice a month.101 
 
In most field offices, this was institutionalized in 2006 with the intro-
duction of local ‘One UN’ meetings once or twice a month.102 All the 
agencies and sections present their projects and challenges at these 
meetings and coordinate their efforts. In theory, such channelling and 
coordination of efforts between UNMIL and the various agencies are 
central to the task of the HoFO. In practice however, the distribution 
of tasks is not that clear-cut, and the roles of CA and HoFO tend to 
overlap, according to our interviewees.  
 
Informal contact among staff members is important for coordination 
and contextualization beyond formal meetings. This aspect is en-
hanced in the few rural areas where all agencies and sections are 
working in one compound.103 The international staff members often 
meet in the canteen or the recreational facilities, and join in activities 
at the week-end.  
 
The relation between the staff is very close because we are in one compound. In 
Voinjama, UN is in one compound. So we talk with each other every day. 
UNMIL, UNDP, WFP, FAO and all the others. In Zwedru it’s the same. We 
have very good experience with this (…) And when we go to lunch together, of 
course we ask, ‘how is this project going?’, ‘how is that project going?’ And we 
share.104 
 
Such, direct and personal relationships are central to making inter-
agency cooperation and contextualization work.105 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101  UNDP representative, Voinjama. 
102  UN agencies have already withdrawn their permanent staff from some field offices.  
103  The number of counties with a considerable representation of different agencies and 
UNMIL sections is decreasing with the drawdown of the mission.  
104  UNDP staff, Voinjama. 
105  This becomes particularly evident in cases where cooperation is poor. The Montserrado 
County Office was initially located in Bensonville, next to the county administration. It 
was later transferred to the UN HQ Annex. Since then, UN Police and military observers 
have been stationed with their national command, none of the UN agencies has staff with 
a special focus on Montserrado, and the members of UNMIL sections except for CA are 
located in the HQ. This makes inter-agency cooperation and even cooperation with other 
UNMIL sections at the sub-national level more difficult. According to both CA officers, 
the situation was much better when the office was located in Bensonville. 
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6.5  Dilemmas When Promoting National Ownership 
Actors at the local level have good possibilities for contextualizing, 
and they make frequent use of them. The setting on the national level 
is much tighter. The abstract strategic goals of the intervention are 
pre-set by the programmatic portfolio of UN peacekeeping. This ab-
stract outline is not negotiable.106 Moreover, strategies for achieving 
these goals are based on the organizational know-how of UN Peace-
                                                 
106  Sending 2009. 
Recommendations: 
 
General recommendations for local the transition: 
 
 The continuous presence of CA in the counties is central to interna-
tional efforts at the sub-national level. A national mechanism should 
be developed that can replace the CA presences in the counties before 
UNMIL withdraws. Due to lack of capacity when the mission with-
draws, the mechanisms currently in place will probably need to 
change. Therefore it is important that these mechanisms are followed 
up by the UN agencies that will remain in the country.  
 Before the withdrawal of the mission, CA should play a supportive 
role in setting up regional civilian coordination hubs, to serve as a con-
tinuous county extension of the UN Delivering as One idea.  
 CA should encourage and support the government in its work to estab-
lish local Liberian monitoring teams that can ensure accountability for 
and implementation of various development projects. The Peace 
Committees in the counties, established with the support and the facili-
tation of CA, are a first step in this direction. They could be further 
developed, institutionalized and mandated by the government to moni-
tor development projects and the implementation of the County Devel-
opment Agenda. Uninterrupted funding to local monitoring commit-
tees needs to be ensured independent of government approval, whether 
through a mix of international donors or bilateral projects.  
 The various agencies and UNMIL sections should build more on the 
county-specific expertise of HoFO and CA. 
 In some areas, various sections and UN agencies in the field are al-
ready co-located in one compound, an arrangement that offers infor-
mal venues for exchange. In order to ensure a culture of exchange be-
tween actors from the various agencies, this should be done in as many 
places as possible. The compounds could also to a greater extent be 
open to other members of the international community, as this would 
contribute to improved exchange of information in the field.  
 The HoFO structure should be seen as an overall success in combina-
tion with the earlier foundation of County Support Teams (CSTs). 
Equally strong coordination should be envisaged for new missions. 
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keeping. There may be some differences in implementation, but peace 
operations very commonly include such strategies as elections, rule of 
law, security sector reform, poverty reduction, and protection of civil-
ians. Also here, the procedures for reaching such strategic goals are 
dominated by international processes. International experts and know-
how impact heavily on the conceptualization of concept papers, re-
porting and steering committees. 
  
So, a lot was done by the international institutions. In terms of making commit-
ments in funding, they know who has to sit at the table to make sure money is 
coming. This is to ensure the funding is coming. Only 1/3 is coming from the 
government. So when you have the money you have the lead.107  
 
The complicated processes underlying policy papers, development 
agendas and processing guidelines are often overstraining the capaci-
ties of the national ministries. They are supported by international 
consultants, paid by the donors, who assure that finals papers are in 
line with donor interests and funds can be assessed.  
 
Government institutions have capacity challenge. So they have international con-
sultants working along with them. (…) of course they had influence on priori-
ties.108  
 
What seems like a win–win situation at first sight in fact often im-
pedes true ownership for the Liberians. What is planned as ‘doing 
with’ ends up as ‘doing for’.109  
 
In the first time in our history, people could make some suggestions. It was a de-
termined effort to get citizen to participate. (…) But then most was lost on the 
way in the effort to adapt to World Bank standards. People were just asked ‘do 
you want schools’ and they said ‘yes’. Who doesn’t want school? But maybe 
they would have liked something else better. Something that was not on the 
World Bank list.110 
 
CSOs are only consulted in such processes. They have no active voice 
and are reduced to mere implementing partners, fully dependent on 
international funds.  
 
It’s always consultations. When they need us, they invite us and ask as what do 
you think about this and what do you think about that. But never for true cooper-
ation, where they are actually negotiating with us and we have a compromise in 
the end.
111
 
 
                                                 
107  Interview with head of a national CSO network, Monrovia, September 2011 
108  Interview with  leading Liberian political analyst, Monrovia, September 2011 
109  Wilén and Chapaux 2011. 
110  Interview with leading CSO representative, Monrovia, 2011. 
111  CSO representative, Monrovia 2011. 
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Much policy-making and policy-shaping on the national level proves 
to be a negotiation process between national elites and donors, with 
the donors in the lead.
 Ownership gets lost in the need to produce 
documents that meet international standards, and are on time. Far 
too often, national ownership is based on international expertise. Con-
textualization is possible and local actors can have impact, but the 
frame pre-set by international standards and donors on the national 
level is a very tight one. The security hubs, currently established in 
five locations spread over the country, are a first approach to institu-
tionalizing decentralization. They focus on security and rule of law, 
but similar approaches could and should be envisaged for other sectors 
and issues. 
6.6 Can the UN strengthen the confidence of local popula-
tions in central authorities? 
After the war in Liberia, lack of confidence in local representatives of 
the state was a major problem. In 2004 the International Crisis Group 
summed this up:  
 
Politicians have tended to see the capital ‘as a pseudo colonial power with the 
hinterland and the indigenes being colonialized. The local level has no input in 
 
Recommendations: 
 
General recommendations for local-level peacebuilding: 
 
 Continue decentralization efforts of national strategies and strengthen the 
development of county funds and county-specific agendas. 
 Increase the influence of local consultations on final outcomes in develop-
ment strategies and similar documents. Conduct local consultations before 
drafting national agendas. Increase the capacity of local state and non-state 
actors to produce adequate documents. Provide more flexibility for local 
adaptation of national frameworks.  
 Strengthen the voice of marginalized groups in consultations. Conduct sec-
tor-specific consultations and ensure that all groups are heard throughout 
the consultations. Move beyond consultations wherever possible, and seek 
to engage local organizations in dialogue and negotiation of final docu-
ments. 
 UN Peacekeeping missions should increase the capacity of civil society to 
move from implementing partner to strategic analyst, from the very begin-
ning of the mission. They should provide continuous funding to CS, inde-
pendent of specific project implementation, and strengthen CS as an inde-
pendent player to complement the government. 
 Donors should lessen the bureaucratic red tape and preconditions for ac-
cessing international funds and credits, to enable more small-scale projects 
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decision-making’. (…)There are numerous posts at chiefdom, district and county 
level, with overlapping tasks and meaningless positions whose only objective is 
to make money and feed the patronage system while taking a heavy toll on reve-
nue.112 
 
Although there have been considerable improvements, confidence in 
authorities continues to be a challenge in post-war Liberia. People in 
powerful positions are perceived as delegates of a small and unap-
proachable elite in Monrovia. The local population has little influence 
on choosing its county and district leadership, apart from national 
elections. Engaged citizens still have few opportunities to take action 
against the exploitative behaviour of local officials. 
 
UNMIL as a whole, and CA in particular, are there to support the 
government. They are not mandated to interfere in the selection of 
personnel for positions. Moreover, there is little that they can do if 
such persons refuse to work or to cooperate with Civil Affairs. In sev-
eral such cases, CA in the counties has worked closely with CSOs and 
documented misconduct on the part of local authorities.  
 
According to several interviewees, there is still much work to be done 
in order to build up local confidence in the central authorities. In the 
population, mistrust of the government remains rampant. If conflict 
arises, people tend to ask CA for advice, rather than local authorities. 
A local NGO coordinator in Voinjama confirmed this:   
 
If people have an issue, they very often go to Civil Affairs and not directly to the 
local authority, because through civil affairs there is a good chance that their is-
sue is actually followed up.113  
 
For many of the non-state actors, CA constitutes a third neutral party 
that can report on issues and provide increased transparency on a mat-
ter. Through its presence, ‘CA is making sure that the government de-
livers’114.. Complaints about government authorities are often chan-
nelled through CA in an attempt to increase recognition and weight, 
while at the same time protecting the complainant against retributive 
action.  
 
This role is central to local-level peacebuilding and future stability.  
But what CA has done is to build confidence among the local popula-
tion in the capacities of CA, not in those of the local authorities. This 
poses a threat to transitional and post-UNMIL stability. The Peace 
Committees (PC), currently built up in the counties with the support of 
CA, represent one possible way out of this dilemma. At best, they can 
                                                 
112  International Crisis Group, ‘Rebuilding Liberia’, 22. Parts of this quote have been taken 
from an interview ICG conducted with a historian at the University of Liberia in Mon-
rovia in 2003. 
113  Local NGO coordinator, Voinjama. 
114  Professor at University of Liberia, Monrovia. 
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strengthen the confidence of the local people in their own capabilities 
to make governments work.  
 
 
Case Study 2: Peace Committees 
 
In 2009 a unit in Civil Affairs strongly pushed for local consultations as part of its 
peacebuilding and reconciliation programme. 15 County Consultative Forums were 
initiated in early 2009, one in each county.
115
  Members of these forums articulated 
the need for a local mediation mechanism, working with community approaches to 
resolve conflict. Leading actors of the CS established community driven PCs 
throughout the country facilitated by CA. 
 
The composition of these Peace Committees was regarded as a critical condition. It 
was decided that members had to be local people, that they should reflect the varie-
ty of the population (women, youth, religious leaders, traditional leaders etc.) and 
have a deep understanding of the cultural and historical background of the area. 
Their work is voluntarily and unpaid.
116
  They are not part of any governmental 
authority.  
 
These committees today are engaged in a broad range of activities: land-dispute 
mediation, educating communities on land and property acquisition, SGBV issues, 
peace education in schools, mediating ethnic feuds, engaging with traditional lead-
ers and compiling updates of land conflicts. In the current setup, they even support 
state authority by taking over some of its roles and responsibilities. When conflicts 
occur, the PCs step in to mediate and solve the issue based on traditional approach-
es. This helps reduce the workload of courts and often produces resolutions that are 
more accepted by the community.  
 
When we were in displaced camp in Monrovia, we heard that someone has tak-
en our garden and was claiming ownership. When this case went to authorities 
in Voinjama, the authorities were bribed to put the case on hold. Nothing hap-
pened for years. When we returned we wanted the land back. So there was near-
ly fight. Finally, we settled the traditional way. The town chief said it has been 
our land before. The other person was given other land. Now we are all in 
peace.
117
 
 
 
In the case of land disputes, the interventions of the PCs are currently being formal-
ized. Until now, traditional resolutions have been non-binding. Parties in conflict 
who accepted a ruling in the first place, could go back to court at any point in time 
and restart the whole process, even years after the initial agreement. After formali-
zation, resolutions of the Peace Committee will become legally binding if they are 
in accordance with legal standards and if the parties in conflict sign a memorandum 
of understanding prior to the negotiation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
115  A comprehensive description of these events and issues discussed can be found in Deal-
ing with Conflict Creatively, published by the Civil Affairs Section of UNMIL, 2009. 
116  Since 2009 these committees have received training in  mediation, conflict resolution, 
conflict prevention and reconciliation from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and 
others. 
117  Local farmer, village near Voinjama. 
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Recommendations: 
 
 CA as well as the UN agencies should focus on supporting Civil Society to 
increase its capacity to monitor and support the local government as well 
as to mediate in local conflict.  
 The UN should continue its efforts to support the national government and 
the efforts to increase the capacity among local government staff. 
 The UN should continue to support the government’s efforts to build con-
fidence in local authorities. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Our fieldwork was conducted at the central level in Monrovia and in 
rural areas of the country. We found several sections, programmes and 
agencies within the UN family that are working to contextualize 
peacebuilding activities to the local level. Their activities seek to en-
sure that local needs are included in national processes and that a cer-
tain number of projects are implemented in the counties. The close 
cooperation between UN agencies on the local level has been 
strengthened by the DaO framework and can be evaluated as generally 
positive for sub-national efforts. There is a danger that the county-
specific focus currently provided by the HoFO structure and the pres-
ence of CA might get lost with the transition. The number of perma-
nent representative will decrease when UNMIL draws out, taking se-
curity and information infrastructure with it.  
 
There is not yet an institutional learning process to ensure that the 
wide range of local and context-specific knowledge is secured and 
passed on within UNMIL and among UN agencies. Awareness as to 
the need of local sensitivity and contextualization of peacebuilding to 
local circumstances was high among many of our interview partners in 
the field. Local staff were familiar with local circumstances and the 
local context in general. On the other hand, such sensitivity has not 
been seen as a job requirement. It was described as ‘useful asset’118 
that would have to be gained ‘on the job’119.  
 
It’s not that they tell us, it’s like this and that in Lofa. And those are the groups 
and the conflicts. All I knew about Liberia was from international press. Like the 
war and Taylor. Everything else was training on the job.120 
 
Local, context-sensitive, cultural knowledge was greatly valued as a 
resource. But it was not a knowledge pro-actively encouraged, guard-
ed and intentionally passed on within the mission. Awareness of how 
it could better inform the work of the UN still needs to be created.  
 
Despite such inherent limitations within the UN system, UNMIL’s 
efforts at decentralization in Liberia have indeed been impressive. The 
CST joint programme has institutionalized and formalized local–
national communication on the side of the government. The pro-
gramme (re-)builds information infrastructure between local authori-
                                                 
118  CA officer, Voinjama. 
119  CA officer, Greenville. 
120  CA officer, Voinjama. 
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ties, via the superintendent, to the national government. The success 
of this programme will be crucial for the transition phase. The pro-
gramme has not yet been fully implemented, and high priority should 
be given to further decentralization. It is important for the future of 
Liberia that basic services are well handled by the Liberian state appa-
ratus when UNMIL withdraws, otherwise considerable efforts and re-
sources may be lost. It is further important to strengthen the voice of 
local actors in a heavily centralized state. A specific programme 
should be envisioned to ensure the continued functionality of local 
CSOs after UNMIL’s departure.  
 
At first glance, many of our findings at the sub-national level may 
seem stand in contrast to the findings of the criticisms of liberal 
peacebuilding. UNMIL is indeed supporting the national government. 
Local populations are consulted in development planning. The local 
level has been strengthened, and field offices provide an institutional-
ized infrastructure for contextualizing peacebuilding to local circum-
stances. These field offices work rather independently from the na-
tional level, and sensitivity to local needs is high among local staff. 
However, we have found that national dynamics and donor priorities 
often reduce their impact on national strategies and policy develop-
ment. Some contextualization to local circumstances takes place, but 
within the frameworks pre-set by international guidelines and priori-
ties.  
 
Our conclusion thus is a double-edged one. Yes, there is a huge poten-
tial for contextualizing peacebuilding to local circumstances within 
the existing structure in Liberia, and there is much in the case of Libe-
ria that points towards success. However, this potential for contextual-
ization has not been fully exploited and often not adequately valued at 
the national level. Moreover, in focusing precisely on the national lev-
el, scholarly research has often failed to acknowledge this important 
potential.  
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